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1. Introduction 
 
The entry of foreign banks into the banking sector of developing countries has 
increased in the past decade. Gopalan and Rajan (2009) explained foreign bank 
penetration in Asia thus: “The relatively low penetration of foreign banks into Asia is 
consistent with the fact that while Asian economies have been deregulating their 
banking systems, they have approached this process more cautiously than their 
counterparts in Eastern Europe or Latin America.” However, this is not the case for the 
Indonesian banking sector. Foreign capital entry into the Indonesian banking sector is 
fully liberalized; as a result, most major commercial banks in the Indonesian banking 
sector are owned by foreign capital through the acquisition of Indonesian local private 
banks. 
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Before the Asian crisis, there were two types of foreign ownership in the Indonesian 
banking sector: joint venture banks (hereafter, joint banks) and foreign banks. The entry 
of foreign capital had been allowed to enter into the Indonesian banking sector was 
permitted via both in the forms of joint banks and foreign banks. A joint bank is held by 
a foreign bank and local capital. A foreign bank is a full-fledged subsidiary of a foreign 
bank, with 100% ownership by the foreign bank. 
Joint banks and foreign banks have operated in the Indonesian market since the 
second comprehensive financial reform in 1988. These foreign ownership banks provide 
wholesale banking services to both their home countries’ companies and to international 
companies; thus, joint and foreign banks’ financial services were separated from the 
local banking businesses, which dealt with both wholesale and retail banking in the 
local market. With the acquisition of local private banks by foreign capital, there is a 
new type of foreign ownership—local private banks owned by foreign capital. 
This study investigates the effects of presence of foreign capital in local banks on 
their behavior and performance. Previous empirical studies have explained that foreign 
banks tend to lend mainly to large firms and the government rather than to smaller 
businesses due to information cost (Detragiache et al., 2008). The current study focuses 
on SME credit. Increasing SMEs’ access to finance is important for economic 
development. The Indonesian government and the central bank, Bank Indonesia, have 
continually adopted various policies to enhance SMEs’ accessibility to finance. It is 
important to consider whether foreign capital entry will affect lending to SMEs. This 
study examines this question, along with the effects on profitability. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review. 
Section 3 contains a brief overview of the Indonesian banking sector. Section 4 
examines liberalization of foreign capital investment in the banking sector. Section 5 
describes recent foreign capital entry. Section 6 examines the effects of foreign capital 
entry by qualitative analysis of individual banks’ financial data in 2001–2009. Section 7 
presents conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Many studies have discussed the advantages of foreign banks entering developing 
countries’ banking sectors. Foreign bank participation brings advanced techniques to the 
banking business and enhances good governance. Berger et al. (2005) examined the 
effects of changes in banks’ corporate governance on bank performance after changes in 
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bank ownership structures during the 1990s and early 2000s. They stated that these 
changes substantially altered the governance of the world’s banking organizations. 
Dmiruguc-Kunt and Huisnga (1999) explain that foreign ownership is associated 
with higher net interest margins and profits in developing countries. 
Clarke et al. (2006) investigated whether higher foreign bank participation improves 
the access to external financing for firms in 35 developing and transition economies. 
Their results showed that all enterprises, including small and medium-sized ones, in 
countries having higher levels of foreign bank presence reported facing lower financing 
obstacles. 
 
 
3. Indonesian Banking Sector 
 
   The Indonesian banking sector comprises two types of banks: commercial banks and 
people’s credit banks (BPR: bank perkreditan rakyat). The former has the main banking 
functions in the Indonesian banking sector, while the latter are small-sized banks, 
providing limited services and regarded as secondary banks. 
 The commercial banking sector comprises five types of banks, categorized by 
ownership: state-owned banks, regional development banks, private banks which 
comprise private foreign-exchange banks (forex banks) and private 
non-foreign-exchange banks (non-forex banks), joint banks, and foreign banks. 
State-owned banks’ more than 60% of their total shares are held by the Indonesian 
government.  Regional development banks are held by regional governments. Private 
banks were originally fully owned by local capital. Joint banks are held by domestic 
capital and a foreign bank. Foreign banks are fully owned by a foreign bank. 
 Traditionally, foreign and joint banks provided wholesale banking; thus, foreign 
capital ownership was differentiated from the domestic retail banking market. However, 
recent foreign capital entry into the Indonesian banking sector changed the original 
banking structure. Currently, the domestic retail banking market has become a mixed 
market, comprising domestically owned and foreign-owned banks. 
 There are 120 commercial banks in Indonesia’s banking sector: 4 state-owned banks, 
26 regional development banks, 36 forex banks, 30 non-forex banks, 14 joint banks, and 
10 foreign banks, as of the end of 2012. As of June 2012, there were 25 private banks 
owned by foreign capital. 
State-owned banks account for 40% of the total earning assets of all commercial 
banks, followed by forex banks (37%), foreign banks (8%), regional development banks 
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(8%), joint banks (5%), and non-forex banks (2%). 
  
 
4. Liberalization of Foreign Capital Ownership of Financial Institutions 
 
Foreign capital entry was liberalized in 1988. In October 1988, the government 
announced a banking-sector reform policy package—Paket 27 Oktober 1988 
(PAKTO)—as the second financial reform after the first financial reform, which had 
been in 1983. PAKTO enabled the entry of domestic and foreign banks into the 
Indonesian banking sector. Since 1968, the establishment of new private banks had been 
restricted. PAKTO allowed both domestic and foreign banks to establish new private 
banks on the precondition that the new bank had a minimum paid-up capital of Rp10 
billion. 
The entry of new foreign banks was conditional; newly admitted banks could enter 
the market only via a partnership with a domestic private bank, and they were to extend 
credit to the export-credit equivalent of 50% of the total outstanding credit.  
Indonesian Banking Law No.7/1992 stipulated that foreigners/foreign entities be 
allowed to own up to 49% of local banks via stock holding. Indonesian Banking Law 
No.10/1998, an amendment to law No.7/1992, stipulated that foreigners/foreign entities 
be allowed to purchase a local bank’s stock directly and/or via the stock exchange. 
Presidential Regulation No. 29/1999 permitted foreign entities to hold up to 99% 
ownership of local capital banks. It regulates foreign investor ownership as follows: 
(1) Of the total shares, a maximum of 99% share ownership of banks is permitted 
by foreign investors and/or foreign institutions via direct placement or the 
Stock Exchange. 
(2) The purchase of shares by foreign investors or foreign institutions through the 
Stock Exchange can reach 100% of the total shares listed on the Stock 
Exchange. 
(3) Banks can list their shares on the Stock Exchange up to a maximum of 99% of 
the total shares. 
(4) At least 1% of banks’ shares not listed on the Stock Exchange must be owned by 
an Indonesian citizen or by an Indonesian company. 
 
This drastic change in ownership policy on foreign capital brought about a 
substantial change in the Indonesian banking sector. The impact of this change is 
examined in Section 6. 
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5.  Foreign Capital Entry into the Banking Sector  
 
Currently, foreign capital and foreign banks are permitted to participate in the 
banking sector; as a result, the local banking sector is dominated by foreign-owned 
banks. Banking restructuring after the Asian crisis nationalized 13 private banks, which 
were put under the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Public capital was 
injected into 27 ailing private banks under the bank recapitalization program. Therefore, 
most major banks were temporarily nationalized. The government planned to divest its 
shares of nationalized banks within five years after the capital injection. 
Before the crisis, major private Indonesian banks were owned by conglomerates that 
dominated the Indonesian corporate sector. The crisis affected this corporate sector, too. 
It was heavily damaged and lacked the ability to buy back the banking shares that had 
been transferred to IBRA. Meanwhile, foreign capital, including sovereign-wealth funds 
such as Tamasek in Singapore and Kazanah Investment in Malaysia, were interested in 
entering into the Indonesian banking sector. As of June 2012, the 15 largest banks 
comprise four state-owned banks, eight forex banks owned by foreign capital, one forex 
bank owned by local capital and two foreign banks. Assets of these top 15 banks 
account for 71% of the total assets of all commercial banks (Table 1). Besides the top 
banks, medium-sized banks also have been acquired by foreign capital. Foreign banks 
begin operations in the Indonesian market by acquiring Indonesian small and 
medium-sized commercial banks, including non-forex banks. For example, 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi-UFJ, a Japanese bank, and a consumer finance company, ACOM, 
jointly acquired a medium-sized Indonesian bank, Bank Nusantara Parahyangan, in 
August 2006, aiming to enter the consumer finance market in Indonesia. In December 
2006, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) acquired a 90% ownership in 
Bank Halim Indonesia. The largest Indian commercial bank, State Bank of India (SBI), 
acquired Bank IndoMonex in December 2006, and Bank of India (BoI) bought Bank 
Swadesi (currently Bank India of Indonesia) in June 2007. Banks in the Middle East 
also have shown interest in Indonesian banks. Kuwait’s Boubyan Bank bought a 20% 
share in Bank Muamalat, an Indonesian Islamic bank, and Bahrain’s AlBaraka Islamic 
Bank was approved to enter into the Indonesian banking sector in 2011†. Thirteen more 
private banks were acquired by foreign capital (see Table 1). 
  
                                                   
† The acquisition is not implemented as of March 2013. 
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Table 1 Foreign Ownership among Indonesia’s Top 15 Banks 
  Name Ownership Type* 
Assets 
(Bil.IDR)  
1 Bank Mandiri State-owned Bank S 506,553 13.02% 
2 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) State-owned Bank S 461,135 11.85% 
3 Bank Central Asia (BCA)** Farindo Investments => Djarum group (47.15%) Fx 408,579 10.50% 
4 Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) State-owned Bank S 306,878 7.89% 
5 Bank CIMB - Niaga CIMB Group Sdn Bhd, Malaysia (96.92%) Fx 179,425 4.61% 
6 Bank Danamon Indonesia Asia Financial Pte. Ltd (67.37%) Fx 152,393 3.92% 
7 Bank Panin  ANZ Bank Group (39%)  Fx 128,036 3.29% 
8 Bank Permata Standard Chartered Bank (44.505%) Fx 110,579 2.84% 
9 Bank Internasional Indonesia (BII) Maybank, Malaysia (97.4%) Fx 102,052 2.62% 
10 Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN)  State-owned Bank S 95,512 2.45% 
11 Bank OCBC-NISP  OCBC (75%)  Fx 68,962 1.77% 
12 Hong Kong Shanghai Bank  UK F 62,159 1.60% 
13 Citibank  USA F 61,895 1.59% 
14 Bank UOB Indonesia UOB, Singapore (99%) Fx 58,827 1.51% 
15 Bank Bukopin  Domestic (Koperasi Bulog) P 58,168 1.49% 
Total of Top 15 banks                                                                               70.96% 
Other banks acquired by foreign capital 
 
Bank BTPN TPG Nusantara S.a.r.l, US (57.87%) NFx 52,006 1.34% 
Lippo Bank 
Santubong Investments BV, Malaysia 
(87.03%) 
Fx 39,059 1.00% 
Bank Muamalat 
Islamic Development Bank, Saudi Arabia 
(3.274%), Boubyan Bank Kuwait (19.03%) 
Fx 32,689 0.84% 
Bank Ekonomi HSBC Asia Pacific Holdings, UK (98.94%) Fx 23,690 0.61% 
Bank ICB Indonesia ICBC, China (97.5%) Fx 22,363 0.57% 
Bank Nesantara Parahyangan 
Acom, Co., Ltd. Japan (60.3%), 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, Japan (15.2%) 
Fx 7,743 0.20% 
Bank Mestika Daharma Mestika Benua Mas, Malaysia (99.95%) Fx 6,955 0.18% 
Bank ICB Bumiputra ICB Financial Group, Swiss (69.9%) Fx 6,840 0.18% 
Bank Haga Rabobank, Netherlands Fx->J 4,505 0.12% 
Bank QNB Kesawan Qatar National Bank (69.59%) Fx 4,214 0.11% 
Hana Bank Hana Bank, Korea (75.1%) Fx 4,205 0.11% 
Bank of India Indonesia*** Bank of India (76%) Fx 2,359 0.06% 
Bank SBI Indonesia State Bank of India (76%) Fx 2,197 0.06% 
Bank Arta Niaga Kencana Bank Commonwealth, Australia (83.01%) Fx->J 1,429 0.04% 
Bank Hagakita Rabobank, Netherlands Fx->J 1,375 0.04% 
Bank Andara Marcy Corps, US (26.15%), IFC (17.87%) NFx 907 0.02% 
Bank Akita Barclays Bank, UK (99%) NFx 268 0.01% 
Abglomas International Bank Wishart Investment Inc., Virgin Island (90%) Fx 156 0.00% 
    Total     76.4% 
* S = State bank, Fx = Forex bank, NFx=Non forex bank,  J = Joint Bank, F=Foreign bank. Shadowed area indicates 
foreign ownership. 
** Djarum Group, Indonesia’s biggest conglomerate, acquired 50.24% of PT Bank Central Asia (BCA) shares from 
Farindo Investments in December 2010. 
Source: EKOFIN and Infobank, Infobank Outlook 2013, and Bank Indonesia, Laporan Keuangan Publikasi Bank 
*** Formerly Bank Swadesi. 
 
7 
 
6. Impact of Foreign Capital Entry on the Indonesian Banking Sector 
 
This section empirically examines the impact of foreign capital entry on banking 
performance and credit to SMEs. 
 
6.1 Empirical examination 
Previous studies show positive effects of foreign capital entry on bank performance 
because of competition in the domestic banking sector and efficiency in management. 
Dmiruguc-Kunt and Huisnga (1999) explain that foreign ownership is associated with 
higher net interest margins and profits in developing countries. However, our main 
focus is changes in lending behavior, especially to SMEs. 
We first reviewed bank performance, focusing on forex banks and foreign entry 
banks, because the effects of foreign capital entry must be compared with forex banks, 
not with joint or foreign banks. 
Our dataset comprised 94 banks: 4 state-owned banks, 33 forex banks, 31 non-forex 
banks, 16 joint banks, and 10 foreign banks, which were in a database of Indonesian 
Banking Indicators in EKOFIN. During the period examined, 2001 to 2009, there was a 
gradual increase in the number of foreign capital entry banks. In 2001, one bank was a 
foreign capital entry bank; in 2009, there were 18‡, including four non-forex banks. 
Tables 2a-e show some financial indicators by bank type. Return on assets (ROA), a 
profitability indicator, varies from -3.3% to 6.5% in a decade (Table 2a). Forex banks’ 
ROA has consistently been less than 2%. The level of foreign capital entry banks is 
similar to forex banks. Joint and foreign banks show relatively higher profitability. The 
net interest margin (NIM) of forex banks and foreign entry banks is about 6%, which is 
lower than that of state and non-forex banks and higher than joint banks and foreign 
banks (Table 2b). In terms of cost effectiveness, the operational expense ratios (OER) 
(ratio of operational expense to operational income) of forex banks and foreign entry 
bank are higher, exceeding 100% in 2008–2009. Joint and foreign banks show better 
efficiency (Table 2c). Performance of joint and foreign banks is relatively better than 
local capital banks, such as state owned banks, forex and non-forex banks.. Thus, we 
infer that foreign capital entry to Indonesian banks would improve bank performance. 
State and non-forex banks are the primary credit providers to SMEs (Table 2e). 
Forex banks provide 10% of the total credit to SMEs. Interestingly, foreign capital entry 
banks gradually decreased credit to SMEs from 16.3% in 2001 to 7.4% in 2009. In 2001 
foreign capital entry bank provided more credit to SMEs than forex banks. The marginal 
                                                   
‡ The number had increased to 23 as of June 2012. 
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figures of joint and foreign banks appear to be due to different business models than 
local banks. 
 
Table 2a ROA 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
State  1.3% 1.8% 2.1% 3.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 
Forex 1.3% 1.4% 1.6% -3.3% 1.7% 1.9% 1.6% -1.2% -1.3% 
Non-forex 2.2% 1.4% 1.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.8% 1.6% 1.5% 
Joint 6.5% 2.2% 3.3% 3.4% 4.7% 4.0% 3.6% 3.4% 3.5% 
Foreign 2.3% 3.5% 3.3% 4.3% 2.5% 4.1% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 
Foreign Capital Entry 4.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2.9% 2.0% 2.1% 1.9% 1.0% -0.8% 
 
Table 2b NIM 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
State  3.6% 4.2% 5.2% 6.9% 6.7% 6.5% 6.6% 6.8% 6.2% 
Forex 6.0% 4.7% 5.3% 6.4% 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 5.5% 5.6% 
Non-forex 6.9% 6.3% 7.2% 8.7% 7.6% 7.0% 6.8% 6.7% 6.8% 
Joint 6.3% 5.3% 4.7% 4.5% 5.5% 5.8% 5.2% 5.0% 5.1% 
Foreign 3.1% 3.0% 3.2% 3.5% 4.3% 5.2% 5.1% 4.8% 4.2% 
Foreign Capital Entry 5.8% 4.5% 4.7% 6.3% 5.6% 6.2% 6.0% 6.1% 5.6% 
 
Table 2c Operational Expense Ratio 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
State  92.4% 88.6% 86.4% 74.6% 84.1% 84.2% 81.1% 80.7% 80.3% 
Forex 91.7% 95.8% 88.8% 87.5% 87.8% 87.6% 85.7% 142.7% 147.1% 
Non-forex 92.6% 95.2% 92.4% 103.3% 98.3% 97.0% 97.3% 94.3% 90.9% 
Joint 91.7% 88.2% 73.6% 93.3% 74.0% 68.4% 67.7% 68.8% 65.6% 
Foreign 89.5% 72.0% 91.3% 61.1% 73.6% 63.7% 65.8% 65.5% 56.5% 
Foreign Capital Entry 88.0% 88.0% 86.2% 73.2% 83.1% 84.1% 83.8% 93.7% 112.1% 
 
Table 2e SMEs’ Credit/Total Credit 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
State  30.1% 29.0% 26.8% 25.9% 24.4% 25.5% 25.8% 24.6% 25.0% 
Forex 15.5% 14.3% 14.7% 11.3% 10.0% 11.9% 10.9% 10.6% 10.3% 
Non-forex 32.8% 26.1% 22.7% 22.4% 23.5% 21.3% 20.2% 17.4% 17.0% 
Joint 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 1.4% 2.6% 3.2% 
Foreign 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
Foreign Capital Entry 16.3% 10.7% 8.9% 9.3% 7.7% 8.4% 6.9% 7.9% 7.4% 
 
 
6.2 The empirical model 
   The impact of foreign capital entry on the performance and behavior of banks is 
examined by pooled OLS using 69 private banks’ annual financial data (2001–2009). 
We estimate the following equation: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖,   (1) 
 
where Y represents the dependent variables of bank performance and operation, ROA , 
NIM and OER. X is a vector of basic characteristics of individual banks. IV represents 
instrument variables. 
 The variable of primary interest is the Entry Dummy; it takes the value of 1 when the 
bank is acquired by foreign capital, 0 otherwise.  
 The dependent variables are ROA, NIM, and OER. ROA is net revenues divided by 
total book assets, which measures a bank’s comprehensive performance. NIM is a 
measure of the return on a bank’s investments relative to its interest expenses, calculated 
by the difference between total interest income and total interest expense divided by 
total earning assets. OER represents a measure of what it costs to operate a piece of 
property compared to the income that the property brings in.  
The remaining independent variables are used to control for other factors that may 
affect the level of bank performance. ASSET is the natural log of book value of total 
assets. Since larger banks can diversify their credit portfolios, they are exposed to less 
risk and higher revenue. Therefore, the coefficient of ASSET is expected to be positive. 
CREDIT is the ratio of total credits to total assets. CREDIT is used to control for the 
effect of the bank’s activity mix on bank performance. A positive coefficient of CREDIT 
would indicate that banks with high interest-bearing assets are profitable. EQUITY is 
the ratio of total equity to total assets in book value. Since a bank’s performance is 
positively associated with its financial condition, the coefficient of EQUITY is expected 
to be positive. NPL is amount of non-performing loans per total loans; high NPL 
negatively affects profit and positively affects expense. ADMIN is the ratio of 
administration expense to total assets.  
Regarding the impact of SEM credit, to address the endogeneity problem the 
following equation is estimated by fixed-effect model. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖  (2) 
 
where Y represents the dependent variables of SMEs’ credit ratio. To address 
endogeneity, the equation includes a 2-lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. The other independent variables are the same as in equation (1).  
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6.3 Results 
Table 3 shows the regression results on bank performance. Our primary interest is 
Entry_Dummy (1 is a foreign capital entry bank). The coefficient of Entry_Dummy is 
negative and statistically significant at 10 % level for ROA. For NIM, it is negative and 
significant too, for OER it is positive but insignificant. 
 
Table 3 Impact on Performance 
  ROA   NIM   OER   
lag_ASSET -0.012  -0.027 *** -0.044  
 (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.142)  lag_CREDIT 0.024 
 
0.056 *** -0.032 
 
 (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.123)  lag_EQUITY 0.092 *** 0.065 *** -0.385 ** 
 (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.162)  lag_NPL -0.038 
 
-0.019 
 
0.706 
 
 (0.032)  (0.012)  (0.461)  lag_ADMIN -0.759 
 
0.647 * 27.123 *** 
 (0.69)  (0.362)  (7.066)  lag_CREDITF -0.003 
 
-0.045 *** -0.581 ** 
 (0.025)  (0.011)  (0.238)  IV_Asset_sq 0.000 
 
0.001 *** 0.001 
 
 (0.001)  (0)  (0.004)  IV_CREDITF_sq 0.063 *** 0.001 
 
0.484 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.108)  Entry_Dummy -0.010 * -0.008 *** 0.014  
  (0.006)   (0.002)   (0.057)   
Number of obs = 833 
     Prob > F      = 0 
 
0  0  R-squared     = 0.093 
 
0.2511  0.122  Root MSE      = 0.06757   0.03033   0.61079   
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis. 
         * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
  
The results indicates that foreign capital entry affects bank performance negatively, 
however, performance of forex banks besides foreign capital entry banks basically do 
not show good performance. Therefore it is needed another comparative examination of 
forex banks and foreign capital entry banks in the next step. 
The effect of foreign capital entry banks (Entry_Dummy) on credit to SMEs is 
showed in Table 4. The coefficient of Entry_Dummy is negative and significant at 0% 
level. It indicates that foreign capital entry into local banks decrease credit to SMEs. 
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Table 4 Result of Impact on SME Credit 
  SME Credit Ratio   
   lag_ASSET -0.364 *** 
 (0.049)  lag_CREDIT 0.156 *** 
 (0.029)  lag_EQUITY -0.050  
 (0.102)  lag_NPL -0.017  
 (0.031)  lag_ADMIN -2.109  
 (1.424)  lag_CREDITF -0.305 *** 
 (0.04)  IV_Asset_sq 0.012 *** 
 (0.002)  IV_CREDITF_sq 0.049 * 
 (0.025)  Entry_Dummy -0.047 *** 
  (0.013)   
Number of obs = 833  Prob > F      = 0  R-squared     = 0.2839   
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis. 
         * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Many studies have investigated the effects of foreign bank entry into developing 
countries. The Indonesian banking market is fully liberalized and is dominated by 
foreign bank ownership. This study investigated the impact of foreign ownership on 
Indonesian banks’ performance and lending behavior. Regression analysis shows that 
foreign capital entry into local banks has not positive impact on bank performance as 
measured by ROA and NIM. The coefficient of OER indicates that foreign capital entry 
has an insignificant effect on operational efficiency. However, a more notable result is 
that foreign capital entry negatively affects SMEs’ credit. 
The Indonesian banking sector is relatively small in terms of the size of its real 
economy. Thus, the Indonesian government has made several attempts to increase bank 
credit to the real sector, especially to increase SMEs’ access to credit essential for 
economic development. This study raises concerns about the penetration of foreign 
capital into banking sectors in the Indonesian banking sector. 
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